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Is There A Uniform Trust Act

in Your Future?
By David M. English

T

he National Conference of Com
missioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL) is close to
completing the first comprehensive
attempt at the national level to codify
the law of trusts-the Uniform Trust
Act (Act). This article describes the
reasons for the Act and many of its
provisions. The Act is scheduled
for final reading and approval by
NCCUSL during the summer of
2000, meaning that states may begin
enacting the Act in its final form in
their 2001 legislative sessions. This
article is based on the draft discussed
at NCCUSL' s 1999 annual meeting.

Background
Although the Act will be the first
comprehensive uniform act on the sub
ject of trusts, comprehensive trust
statutes are already in effect in several
states. Notable examples include Cali
fornia, Georgia, Indiana and Texas.
These comprehensive state statutes, as
well as the trust statutes in many other
states, influenced the drafters of the
Act, who borrowed from these
statutes in preparing the Act.
There are several reasons why the
drafting of a uniform act on trusts is
timely. The immediate stimulus for
the drafting of the Act is the much
greater use of trusts in recent years,
both in family estate planning and

commercial transactions in the United
States and internationally. This greater
use of trusts, and the consequent
increase in the number of day-to-day
questions involving trusts, led to a
recognition that the trust law in many
states is quite thin. It also led to a
recognition that the existing uniform
acts relating to trusts, although numer
ous, are incomplete. The primary
source of trust law in most states is the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts and
the multi-volume treatises by Scott
and Bogert. These sources, however,
fail to address many practical issues
and sometimes provide conflicting
guidance. It is hoped that the Act will
provide precise answers to these ques
tions in an easily findable place. Thus,
the Act will serve an important educa
tional function. Lawyers in many
states will for the first time be able
actually to determine their state law
on trusts.
Many uniform acts on trust law
topics exist, but none provide compre
hensive coverage. The Act incorpo
rates certain of these smaller acts.
Other uniform acts that address more
specialized topics will continue to be
available for enactment in freestand
ing form. Still others are now obsolete.
The Act incorporates, with many
updates, the 1964 Uniform Trustee
Powers Act, enacted in 16 states. The
Act also incorporates without change

the 1994 Uniform Prudent Investor
Act enacted to date in 35 states. States
enacting the Act should repeal their
version of the Uniform Trustee Powers
Act and recodify into the larger Act
their version of the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act. Existing uniform acts that
the Act does not touch include the Uni
form Principal and Income Act, Man
agement of Institutional Funds Act,
Custodial Trust Act, Common Trust
Fund Act, Supervision of Trustees for
Charitable Purposes Act and Testa
mentary Additions to Trusts Act.
Now obsolete, at least for states
enacting the Act, is Article VII of the
Uniform Probate Code. Article VII is
a mini trust statute addressing only
selected topics, focusing primarily
on trust registration, jurisdiction and
trustee liability to third persons. The
1937 Uniform Trusts Act is also obso
lete, even though only six states
enacted it and none within the past
several decades. Despite its ambitious
and similar title, the 1937 act was like
wise a limited statute. Its principal
focus was the duty of loyalty, the
voting of securities by trustees and,
similar to Uniform Probate Code
Article VII, trustee liability to
third persons.
The Act is being drafted in coor
dination with the revision of the
Restatement of Trusts. The American
Law Institute (ALI) approved the

'�Lawyers in many states will for the first time be able actually
to determine their state law on trusts."
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Restatement (Second) of Trusts, the
last complete edition of this work,
in 1957. Beginning in the late 1980s,
work on the Restatement (Third)
began under the leadership of Edward
Halbach of the University of California at Berkeley; Halbach is the Restatement's reporter. The ALI completed
and approved the portion of Restatement (Third) relating to the prudent
investor rule and other investment
topics in 1992. This portion formed
the basis for the 1994 Uniform Prudent
Investor Act.
In 1996, the ALI approved a tentative draft of the portion of Restatement (Third) relating to the rules on
the creation and validity of trusts. In
May 1999, the ALI also approved a
tentative draft of the portion relating
to the office of trustee, interpretation
of trusts and spendthrift provisions
and the rights of creditors. Because the
ALI must approve at least two more
tentative drafts before the Restatement
(Third) is complete, work on it will
continue well beyond the completion
of the Act. As a result of the coordination between the two projects, many
provisions of the Act track the concepts expressed in the Restatement
(Third) and, for parts of the Restatement (Third) not yet completed,
the relevant portions of the earlier
Restatement (Second).
Although the Act is a comprehensive trust statute, it does not attempt
to codify all trust law. Rather, the
Act codifies only those portions of
trust law that are most amenable to
codification. The Act omits no major
trust law topic but leaves much of the
detail, particularly on topics such as
interpretation of trust terms and
remedies for breach of trust, to
the common law of trusts and
principles of equity. Nowhere is
the common law more clearly stated
than in the various Restatements of
Trusts. Lawyers who require further
explication on the meaning of one or
more of the provisions of the Act will
probably find it by consulting not
only the comments to the Act, but
also the Restatements.

Overview of the Act
The organization of the Act indicates its scope. The drafters organized
the Act into 11 articles. In addition
to providing definitions, Article 1
addresses topics such as the ability
of a trust instrument to override the
Act's provisions, the validity of choice
of law provisions and the law to govern in the absence of a choice and the
procedure for transferring the principal place of administration to another
jurisdiction. Article 2 addresses
selected topics involving judicial
proceedings concerning trusts. This
minimal coverage was deliberate
because the drafting committee concluded that most issues relating to
jurisdiction and procedure are best
left to other bodies of law, such as the
rules of civil procedure. Article 3 deals
with the important topic of representation of beneficiaries, including principles of virtual representation, which
apply whether the matter is to be
resolved in or out of court.
Article 4, which begins the heart of
the Act, specifies the requirements for
creating, modifying and terminating
trusts. The provisions on the creation
of trusts largely track traditional doctrine; those relating to modification
and termination liberalize the law, at
least in most states. Article 5 covers
spendthrift provisions and rights of
creditors, both of the settlor and beneficiaries. Article 6 collects special rules
relating to revocable trusts, including
the standard of capacity, the procedure
for revocation or modification and the
statute of limitations on contests.
Article 7 turns to the office of
trustee, specifying the rules, absent
special provision in the trust, on a
variety of topics. Included are the
rules on trustee acceptance, rights
and obligations of co-trustees, the
procedure for resignation, the
grounds for removal, the methods
for appointing successors and
trustee compensation.
Article 8, entitled "Fiduciary
Administration," prescribes the duties
and powers of the trustee. The powers

listed are an updated version of the
Uniform Trustee Powers Act, including coverage of such current topics as
the power to deal with environmental
hazards. The specified duties of the
trustee, like the duty of loyalty, are not
new, but the particulars have changed
over the years. The Act reflects this
trend. The drafters prepared Article
8 where possible to conform to the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act. The
Uniform Prudent Investor Act prescribes a trustee's responsibilities
with regard to the management and
investment of trust property. The
Act expands on this by specifying
the trustee's duties for distributions
to beneficiaries.
Article 9 provides a place for the
jurisdiction enacting the larger Uniform Trust Act to codify its version
of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act.
Although trustee investment is central
to the law of trusts, due to the widespread enactment of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, the drafters made
no effort to integrate fully the Prudent
Investor Act into the larger Act. The
enacting jurisdiction may instead codify its version of the Uniform Prudent
Investor Act in Article 9 without substantive change.
Article 10 addresses the liability of
trustees and rights of beneficiaries. As
to the rights of beneficiaries, Article 10:
- lists the equitable remedies for
breach of trust;
0 specifies how money damages
are to be determined;
o provides that a court may award
attorneys' fees against the trustee, the
trust or even a beneficiary, as justice
and equity may require; and
* specifies certain trustee defenses,
including the addition of a statute of
limitations for claims alleging breach
of trust and a provision on the enforceability of exculpatory clauses.
As to liability of trustees to third
persons, the Act emphasizes the need
for trustees and others to engage in
commercial transactions with trust
property to the same extent as if the
property were not held in trust. To
protect the privacy of settlors, Article
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10 concludes with a provision authorizing trustees to provide and for third
parties to rely on a certification by the
trustee as to the specific trust terms
relevant to the transaction.
Article 11, which is still a work
in progress, deals with the application
of the Act to existing trusts. The intent
is to give the Act the widest possible
application consistent with constitutional limitations. Consequently, the
Act generally applies not only to trusts
created on or after the effective date,
but also to existing trusts.
A complete analysis of all of the
Act's provisions is beyond the scope
of this article. What follows is a
review of the topics and sections of
the proposed Act that are the most
innovative or that have generated
the most discussion.
Default Rules
Nearly all of the Act consists of
default rules that are subject to variation in the terms of the trust. This is
hardly news. Most statutory provisions on trust law have always been
subject to override in the terms of the
trust. What is innovative about the
Act is the effort for the first time to
collect the circumstances when the
terms of the trust cannot override the
statute. Included among the rules that
a settlor cannot override are:
- the requirements for creating
a trust;
* the rights of third parties in their
dealings with the trustee;
* the power of the court to take
certain actions, such as removing a
trustee;
* a trustee's obligation to act as
a fiduciary in good faith and with
regard to the purposes of the trust and
the interests of the beneficiaries; and
* as described below, the trustee's
duty to keep the beneficiaries
informed.
Revocable Trusts
Recognizing the increasing use and
importance of revocable trusts, the
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"Although the Act is a comprehensive trust
statute, it does not attempt to codify all trust law.
Rather, the Act codifies only those portions of trust
law that are most amenable to codification."

Act collects in one place most of the
provisions relating to revocable trusts.
Article 6 specifies a capacity standard
for creating a revocable trust (the same
standard as for a will), provides a procedure for revocation, adds a statute
of limitations on contests and extends
to revocable trusts the enacting jurisdiction's rules on the construction
of wills. Eliminating a trap for the
unwary, the Act follows the lead of
California, Montana, Oklahoma and
Texas in providing that a trust is
presumed revocable unless stated
otherwise. To avoid the unintentional
rewriting of an existing trust, however,
the Act limits the presumption of
revocability to trusts executed after the
Act's effective date.
The Act allows a revocable trust
to be contested on the same basis as
a will, including for lack of capacity,
undue influence and fraud. The plaintiff must bring the contest no later
than two years after the settlor's
death, but the trustee may shorten
the period to 120 days for a potential
contestant by notifying the potential
contestant of the trust's existence.
Although the beneficiaries remain
liable to return distributions made
before the expiration of the contest
period if the trust later turns out to
have been invalid, the Act generally
protects the trustee. To encourage
expeditious distribution of trust property, a trustee may without liability
begin distributions immediately following the settlor's death. The trustee
loses this protection only if the trustee

is aware that a contest has been
brought or the trustee has been notified of a possible contest, followed by
its actual filing within 30 days.
Modification and
Termination of Trusts
Due to the increasing use in recent
years of long-term trusts, there is a
need for greater flexibility in the current restrictive rules on when a trust
may be modified or terminated other
than as provided in the trust's terms.
The Act provides this increased flexibility without losing sight of the fact
that the settlor's intent is paramount.
At common law, an irrevocable
trust could be modified or terminated
by agreement of the settlor and beneficiaries, or by agreement of the beneficiaries alone if the trust no longer
served a material purpose. In addition,
the administrative terms of a trust
could be modified or terminated due
to circumstances that the settlor did
not anticipate, and a court could
reform either the administrative or
dispositive terms of a trust to correct
for a mistake of law or fact. Modification of a trust to achieve desired tax
results could be accomplished only if
it fit within one of the already established categories.
The Act retains but builds on the
common law rules. Among the provisions providing a liberalizing nudge
are the following:
* Although a spendthrift provision can be a material purpose

barring termination of a trust by
the beneficiaries, this is not an
automatic presumption.
* A court's ability to modify or
terminate a trust because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor
is extended to the trust's dispositive
provisions.
* A trust may be reformed due to
the settlor's mistake of law or fact
even if the terms of the trust, as originally but mistakenly created, are
unambiguous.
0 To achieve the settlor's tax objectives, a court may modify the terms of
the trust as long as the modification
does not violate the settlor's probable
intention. The court may also give
such a modification retroactive effect.
Not recognized at common law,
but recognized in many state statutes
and also in the Act, is the power in a
trustee to combine trusts or divide a
trust without court approval. The
Act also authorizes a court to terminate an uneconomic trust, and permits
a trustee, without court approval, to
terminate a trust with a value of
$50,000 or less.
Cy Pres
Responding to the suggestions
of numerous commentators, the Act
broadens a court's ability to apply cy
pres to charitable trusts. A court may
apply cy pres to modify or terminate a
charitable trust not only when fulfilling the settlor's original charitable
purpose would be impossible or
unlawful but also when such effort
would be impracticable or wasteful.
The Act also abolishes the often artificial distinction between general and
specific charitable intent. The Act
instead creates a presumption of
general charitable intent. Absent a
contrary provision in the terms of the
trust providing for disposition to the
trust property, in applying cy pres,
the court must apply or distribute
the property in a manner consistent
with the settlor's charitable purposes.
Finally, the Act recognizes that default
provisions in favor of noncharities that

are remote in time can sometimes
cause more mischief than help, necessitating detailed searches for heirs
and the running of property through
numerous estates. Consequently,
although the settlor may direct that a
trustee distribute trust property to a
noncharitable beneficiary on the failure or impracticality of the original
charitable scheme, such a default provision is effective for only 30 years
from the date of the trust's creation.
Beneficiary Rights
The Act contains a series of provisions relating to the rights of beneficiaries. Some merely repeat the common law; others are new. Among the
more significant are the provisions on
trustee removal and the obligation to
keep the beneficiaries informed. In
addition to removal for committing a
breach of trust, a court may remove a
trustee in the following situations:
* if a lack of cooperation among
co-trustees substantially impairs the
trust's administration;
- if the investment decisions of the
trustee, even though not constituting a
breach of trust, have resulted in investment performance persistently and
substantially below that of comparable
trusts; or
* if, because of changed circumstances, unfitness or an unwillingness
or inability to administer the trust,
removal would be in the best interests
of the beneficiaries. Removal of a corporate trustee because of changed circumstances might be appropriate, for
example, if the trustee has totally
changed its character due to a corporate merger or acquisition.
When in doubt, the Act favors disclosure to beneficiaries as the better
policy. The Act imposes both a general
obligation on the trustee to keep
"qualified" beneficiaries reasonably
informed of administration, as well as
several specific notice requirements.
The term "qualified beneficiaries,"
which is used with some frequency in
the Act, excludes beneficiaries with
remote remainder interests.

The Act requires a trustee to notify
qualified beneficiaries of the trustee's
acceptance of office and of any change
in the method or rate of the trustee's
compensation. In addition, the Act
codifies the common law duty prescribed in cases such as Allard v.
Pacific National Bank, 663 P.2d 104
(Wash. 1983), to inform qualified
beneficiaries in advance of a sale or
other disposition of real estate, tangible personal property or closely-held
securities comprising a significant
portion of the trust value. The Act
waives disclosure only if forbidden
by law, as can occur with certain
securities transactions, or if disclosure would be detrimental to the
interests of the beneficiaries, a standard that might apply if disclosure
would result in the loss of the only
serious buyer.
The Act requires trustees to make
regular reports to a trust's qualified
beneficiaries. In particular, the trustee
must furnish the qualified beneficiaries at least annually with a report of
the trust property, liabilities, receipts
and disbursements, including the
source and amount of the trustee's
compensation.
The trustee must also promptly
respond to any beneficiary's request
for information, unless the request
is unreasonable under the circumstances. This includes a requirement
that the trustee furnish a beneficiary
with a complete copy of the trust
instrument. The drafting committee
rejected the more limited approach
of letting the trustee determine
which provisions of the trust were
material to the beneficiary's interests.
The trustee's version of what is
material could differ markedly
from what the beneficiary believes
is relevant.
A trust instrument generally cannot waive the trustee's duty to keep
the beneficiaries informed. The Act,
however, creates an exception for beneficiaries under age 25. The Act also
allows "blind" trusts to waive some
or all of the settlor's rights to be
kept informed.
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Trustee Defenses

"Recognizing the increasing use and importance of

The Act recognizes that a trustee is
entitled to reasonable protection from
liability. To allow a beneficiary adequate time in which to bring a claim
yet enable the trustee to limit potential
exposure, the Act includes a statute of
limitations. Absent fraud or misrepresentation, a beneficiary who claims a
breach of trust must commence a judicial proceeding within one year after
the trustee sends the beneficiary a
report adequately disclosing the facts
constituting the claim. This statute of
limitations, however, will not be triggered unless the report informs the
beneficiary of the time bar. A beneficiary's consent, release or ratification
of a transaction may also bar the beneficiary from bringing a claim.
A settlor may include an exculpatory clause in a trust instrument that
limits a trustee's potential liability, and
a trustee may rely on such a clause,
but not without limit. Under traditional doctrine, an exculpatory clause
is unenforceable (a) to the extent that
it relieves a trustee from liability for
breach of trust committed in bad faith
or with reckless indifference to the
trust purposes or the beneficiaries; or
(b) if it was inserted as a result of the
trustee's abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the
trustee and settlor. Disapproving of
cases such as Marsman v. Nasca, 573
N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. Ct. App. 1991),
the Act subjects exculpatory clauses
drafted by or on behalf of the trustee
to special scrutiny. The Act presumes
that the trustee inserted such exculpatory provisions as a result of an abuse
of a fiduciary or confidential relationship unless the trustee establishes that
the provision is fair under the circumstances and that the trustee adequately
communicated its existence and contents to the settlor.
Although a trust instrument
normally contains the entire terms
of the trust, the Act allows a court to
admit extrinsic evidence to clarify
ambiguities, many of which are not
necessarily apparent from a reading

revocable trusts, the Act collects in one place most
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of the provisions relating to revocable trusts."

of an instrument. Alternatively,
grounds may exist, such as a mistake
of law or fact, resulting in the reformation of apparently unambiguous
terms. To allow a trustee to administer
a trust with some dispatch and without concern over misplaced reliance
on the language of the trust instrument, the Act provides that a trustee is
not liable for a breach of trust to the
extent that the breach resulted from
reasonable reliance on the written
terms of the trust.

should not rely on them without
thought. Representation is not binding
if there is a conflict of interest between
the representative and those ostensibly
represented. In that event, the lawyer
should consider the appointment of a
guardian ad litem--termed a "special
representative" under the Act--whose
appointment is available whether the
matter is to be resolved by the court or
by nonjudicial settlement.

Representation of Beneficiaries

Determining a trust's principal
place of administration is important
for a variety of reasons, including
determining which state's income tax,
if any, applies to the trust's income.
As trust administration has become
more complex, determining a trust's
principal place of administration has
become more difficult. Co-trustees
may be located in different states. A
corporate trustee's personal trust officers may be located in one state, its
investment division in another and
its operations facilities in yet another.
In addition, a variety of nontrustees,
such as investment advisers and trust
protectors, may play a role in a trust's
administration. By defining the trust's
principal place of administration as
the usual place where the day-to-day
activity of the trust is carried on by
the trustee or cotrustee primarily
responsible for its administration,
the Act resolves some, but by no
means all, of these difficulties. For
this reason, the Act encourages settlors to address this issue in the trust
provisions. A provision in a trust
instrument that designates the principal place of administration is valid

Article 3 of the Act contains a
comprehensive set of provisions on
representation of beneficiaries. Article
3 addresses not only representation by
fiduciaries such as guardians, conservators and personal representatives,
but also what is known as virtual representation (the representation of
minors, the incapacitated, the unborn
and the unascertained) by beneficiaries
who are legally competent and whose
interests are substantially identical.
The representation provisions may
be used whether a dispute is in court
or is to be settled nonjudicially. The
provisions are available for matters
of ongoing trust administration, such
as notice to the beneficiaries of a
trustee's resignation or of an annual
report. The provisions also apply to
issues involving beneficiary consent,
such as the appointment of successor
trustees or the termination by the beneficiaries of a trust that no longer
serves a material purpose.
The representation provisions are
an added tool that can solve many
practical problems. Lawyers, however,

Principal Place of Administration

and controlling under the Act as
long as a trustee's principal place
of business is located in or a trustee is
a resident of the designated jurisdiction, or if all or part of the trust's
administration occurs in the designated place.
Frequently it becomes necessary
to change a trust's principal place of
administration. Ideally the trust instrument should address this issue. Absent
such a provision, the Act specifies a
procedure for transfer. The transfer
must facilitate the trust's administration and not impair the beneficiaries'
interests. Furthermore, the trustee
must inform the qualified beneficiaries
of the transfer at least 60 days in
advance. If, however, the transfer
involves the appointment of a new
trustee, the requirements for the
appointment of a successor trustee,
either under the trust instrument or
otherwise, must first be satisfied.
Environmental Liability
The Act contains a series of provisions designed to respond to trustee
concerns about possible liability for
accepting and holding property with
environmental hazards. Although a
trustee need not sign a formal acceptance and can accept the office of
trustee by commencing to perform
trustee duties, the Act clarifies that
the inspection or investigation of trust
property to determine potential environmental liability is not evidence
of an implied acceptance. A trustee
may also take action to prevent, abate
or remedy any actual or potential
violation of environmental law;
decline to accept property or disclaim
any power with respect to property;
compromise claims over alleged violation of environmental law; and pay
from trust property the expenses
related to such actions. Finally, a
trustee cannot be held personally
liable under the Act merely because
the trustee holds title to property containing environmental hazards. Liability attaches in such cases only against
the trust property.

Proprietary Mutual Funds
Common trust funds have rapidly
disappeared from corporate trustees'
portfolios, replaced by "proprietary"
mutual funds. The advantage of the
proprietary fund is that capital gains
taxation can be avoided on trust termination. Because they could not be held
other than in trust, common trust
funds holdings had to be liquidated.
Proprietary mutual funds, on the other
hand, can be distributed in kind.
Despite this seeming advantage,
proprietary cause considerable controversy and litigation, implicating the
trustee's duty of loyalty, the duty to
invest with prudence and the right to
receive only reasonable compensation.
Because corporate trustees ordinarily
provide advisory services to and
receive compensation from the funds
that they create, some critics argue that
investing the assets of individual
trusts in proprietary mutual funds is
not necessarily a matter of prudence
but is primarily a method for generating additional fee income. In addition,
because a corporate trustee often
will also charge its regular fee for
administering the trust, critics charge
that a corporate trustee's total compensation, both direct and indirect,
is excessive.
Despite these concerns, nearly all
states have passed statutes that authorize corporate trustees to invest in
proprietary mutual funds, regardless
of whether the trustee will receive
additional fees. Recognizing this
political reality, the Act does not prohibit ifvestment in proprietary mutual
funds but clarifies that these investments are subject to traditional fiduciary responsibilities. The investment
in the proprietary fund must comply
with the prudent investor rule of the
enacting jurisdiction. Furthermore,
only services actually performed for
such compensation may be taken into
account in determining a trustee's reasonable compensation. If by investing
in proprietary funds the trustee in effect
delegates functions it would have otherwise performed in its regular trustee

capacity, the trustee's regular compensation should be reduced. Finally, the
trustee must disclose at least annually
to the persons entitled to receive the
trustee's annual report the rate of extra
compensation received for providing
services to the fund and the method for
determining this compensation.
Spendthrift Provisions and
Rights of Beneficiaries' Creditors
Crafting the provisions of Article 5
on spendthrift protection and the
rights of a beneficiary's creditors
to reach the trust proved to be the
most difficult task in drafting the
Act. The area is controversial, and
conflicting policy directions yield
different results. The result was a compromise, responding at least in part to
the concerns of the different factions.
The Act follows the law currently
in force in all but a few states by providing that a trust is spendthrift only
if the terms of the trust so provide. It
then clarifies a point unclear in many
states. To receive spendthrift treatment, the provision must restrain both
voluntary and involuntary transfer
of the beneficiary's interest. The drafting committee concluded that it was
undesirable as a matter of policy for
a beneficiary to be able to transfer the
beneficiary's interest while at the same
time denying the beneficiary's creditors the right to reach the trust to
satisfy their claims.
The key public policy issue in the
spendthrift area is determining which
classes of creditors should be exempt
from the spendthrift bar. In determining these exceptions, the drafting committee did not start from scratch, but
rather paid particular attention to the
exceptions listed in Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 157 and Restatement
(Third) of Trusts § 59.
Both Restatements and many
states' trust statutes, as well as other
relevant statutes such as Federal Bankruptcy Code § 523(a)(5) and ERISA
§ 206(d)(3), grant special deference
to the enforcement of court orders
for support or maintenance of the
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beneficiary's child, current spouse and
former spouse. Given this background
and the important public policy concerns in making certain that those to
whom legal obligations of support are
owed actually receive such support,
the Act provides that a beneficiary's
child, current spouse or former spouse
who has a judgment against the beneficiary for support or maintenance
may obtain against the trust, in an
appropriate judicial proceeding, an
order attaching present or future distributions to or for the benefit of the
beneficiary. In addition, if the trustee
has abused a discretion or failed to
comply with a standard of distribution, the court may direct the trustee
to pay the child, current spouse or
former spouse an amount that is equitable under the circumstances, but not
more than what the trustee would
have been obligated to pay the beneficiary had the trustee not abused the
discretion or failed to comply with
the standard.
The other public policy issue that
engendered considerable debate was
whether the Act should create an
exception to the spendthrift bar for
creditors who have furnished the beneficiary with so called "necessities."
Even though the necessities doctrine
was perhaps originally derived with
the greengrocer in mind, today it is
used almost exclusively by government agencies seeking reimbursement
for the costs of providing care or to
deny eligibility for Medicaid on the
theory that the beneficiary's interest in
trust is an available resource. Sophisticated drafting normally can protect a
trust from government claims and
result in the exclusion of the trust as
an available resource. Absent such
sophisticated counsel, however, a
necessities exception would be largely
a trap for the unwary. Recognizing the
important role that third party trusts
play in assuring an enhanced quality
of life for individuals with disabilities,
the drafting committee elected not to
create an exception to the spendthrift
bar for providers of necessities. If
governmental agencies are to obtain
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"[A] trustee cannot be held personally
liable under the Act merely because the
trustee holds title to property containing
environmental hazards. Liability attaches in
such cases only against the trust property."

reimbursement for the costs of care,
they must rely on other law.
Self-Settled Trusts
The Act treats rights of a settlor's
creditor to reach the trust separately
from the claims of a beneficiary's
creditors because the issues are different. As to the rights of the settlor's
creditors, the Act follows traditional
doctrine, rejecting and questioning
the wisdom of the recent Alaska,
Delaware, Nevada and Rhode Island
statutes. Under the Act, a settlor's
creditor may reach whatever the
trustee could have paid to the settlor,
whether or not distributions to the
settlor-beneficiary are subject to the
trustee's discretion and whether or
not the trust is irrevocable. Consistent
with the law everywhere, the Act also
provides that, during the lifetime of
the settlor, the property of a revocable
trust is subject to the claims of the settlor's creditors in the same manner as if
no trust were created. Following the
settlor's death, however, the now
irrevocable trust is subject to creditor
claims only to the extent that the settlor's probate estate is insufficient to
satisfy such obligations.
Following a trend in the law, the
Act treats holders of presently exercisable powers of withdrawal the same
as if the holders, because of their
power to obtain the trust property,
were the settlors of revocable trusts.
The result is that trust property subject

to a power of withdrawal is fully
subject to the claims of the holder's

creditors and, following the power's
lapse or release, remains liable to the
extent of the power holder's beneficial
interest in the trust. The Act, however,
creates an important exception to this
general rule. Conforming with the
expectations of the settlors who create
such arrangements, property subject
to a Crummey or "5 x 5" power is
not, following the lapse or release of
the power, subject to the claims of the
power holder's creditors.
Conclusion
This article only samples the Act's
provisions. For more information,
readers should consult the draft Act
itself, which, with extensive comments, is available at www.law.

upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm. Comments are welcome. They may be most
efficiently provided by e-mailing the
author at englishda@missouri.edu.
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